Germany: Continued 'elite precaution' alongside continued public opposition by Dreyer, Marion & Gill, Bernhard






Marion Dreyer/Bernhard Gill 
 
 
Germany: Continued 'elite precaution' alongside continued public opposition 
 
 
Marion Dreyer and Bernhard Gill are at Institute of Sociology, University of Munich, 
Konradstrasse 6, D-80801 München, Germany. Tel: +49 89 2180 3222; Fax: +49 89 2180 2922; 












Germany is the EU member state with the most difficult marketing situation (besides Austria) as 
regards genetically modified (gm) crops and food. At the same time, it shows the least 
administrative effort to respond to the reasons for this situation - public suspicion and protest. 
Regulators advocate specific precaution-related measures, which, however, do not relate to the 
primary demands of critics and opponents. The administration's claim to prioritize scientific 
evidence over politics constructs the administration and the public as two separated worlds 
without real mediation. This contrasts with the ever growing demands for public participation. 
Participation in a broader sense, however, is not dependent on formal opportunities. In this 
conflict, NGOs bring up issues of democracy, transparency and precaution by means of public 
mobilization. An anticipated consumer boycott and, following from this, a commercial blockage 
of gm products are the effects of this strategy. 
 
These dynamics can be analysed as political tensions brought about by a politico-administrative 
system which sticks to a legalistic-scientistic approach when dealing with 'modernization risks'. At 
the level of formal politics, reflexive modernization occurs without 'reflexive politics', that is, 
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In Germany, political debate about modern biotechnology is more than a decade old and is still 
characterized by its intensity and polarization. The recession after German reunification and the 
growing prominence of economic affairs in the early 1990s detracted attention somewhat from the 
biotechnology issue, at least in official circles. Outside the formal political arena, however, 
modern biotechnology remained a prominent issue. Widespread protests and formal objections by 
NGOs and local groups about field trials continued.  
This essay is an analysis of the new stage that the biotechnology conflict has reached with the 
marketing of gm crops in the second half of the 1990s. First, the essay points out the tensions 
resulting from public opposition, on the one hand, and promotional policy of official politics, on 
the other. It then points out, that in this situation the regulators resort to a legalistic and scientistic 
approach. Then, the essay analyses the effects of NGO politics upon the dynamics of 
commercialisation and the political strategy of the technology providers, the agro-chemical 





As in other EU-member states, commercialisation became a public issue in Germany when gm 
food threatened to reach the consumer markets. Public debate erupted with the imports from the 
USA of gm soyabean in the autumn of 1996. Above all, the refusal of the US agro-food system to 
segregate and label conventional and gm soyabean provoked massive criticism and attracted broad 
media coverage. Environmental NGOs accused the producer, the American biotechnology 
company Monsanto, of 'force-feeding' European consumers genetically modified soya. 
 
The use of modern biotechnology in pharmaceutical production has gained somewhat in 
acceptance. By contrast, the public remains sceptical about the technology's use in agriculture and 
extremely critical of its use in food production (Hampel and Renn, 1998: 10-11; Hampel et al., 
1998). Public opposition is voiced and mobilized by environmental organizations (and to a lesser 
extent consumer organizations). They demand comprehensive labelling as a prerequisite for free 
consumer choice concerning products deemed to be associated with ecological uncertainties and 
risks and possible health effects.  
This market- and consumer-related strategy, designed to keep the market of GM products as 
restricted as possible, may be understood as a 'rational' response to a politico-administrative 
system which is (at the federal level) relatively closed to environmental pressure groups and 
increasingly shows a political bias in favor of commercialisation.  
 






While the public, through opinion surveys (see European Commission, 1997) and protest 
activities, expresses continued scepticism about modern biotechnology, both big political parties 
have since the 1990s increasingly expressed their general support for the new technology on the 
grounds of its allegedly high economic potential. The linkage to economic issues is typically 
designed as a 'rhetorical upgrading' of the technology in general and not as an endorsement for 
specific applications such as gm crops and food. Indeed, it would be difficult to make a link, for 
example, between gm oilseed rape and national competitiveness.  
The Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party see modern biotechnology as a 
key technology comparable to microelectronics and information and communication technologies. 
In the face of the competitive pressures of a globalizing economy, and ever-growing 
unemployment, the economic framing of modern biotechnology is directed at presenting the 
public a Hoffnungsträger, in the sense of a promising tool for innovation, a stable job market and 
the maintenance of international competitiveness. The portrayal of modern biotechnology as a 
powerful weapon in the global struggle over jobs and markets is basically wishful thinking 
(Dolata, 1997). This approach has continued under the new government coalition, formed by the 
Social Democratic Party and the Green Party (from 1982 to 1998, the German government was a 
coalition between the Christian Democrats and the Liberals). It forms part of the long-standing 
prominent debate about Germany as a business location as it has been fostered in the 1990s by 
German re-unification, economic recession, and growing unemployment.   
  
The regulatory approach of the Health Ministry and the Genetics/Genetic Engineering Department 
of the Robert Koch-Institut (RKI), which is assigned the role of the national Competent Authority 
(CA) for the approval of GMO releases, has to be seen against the background of this mainly 
positive attitude of official politics towards commercial biotechnology. (As regards gm food, 
responsibility is shared between RKI and the food safety agency of the Health Ministry, BgVV, 
but so far, Germany lacks any practical experience in acting as a rapporteur for genetically 




The official policy approach of the RKI is to keep out of, and remain uninfluenced by, public 
debate. This attitude of political independence is typical of the German administration in 
environmental conflicts, at least as far as the federal level is concerned. Administrative decisions 
are officially justified as being based on the law and supposedly 'objective' scientific expertise, not 
on political influence, mediation and compromise (Gill, 1996).  
As far as the RKI's basic approach, not necessarily its decision making, is concerned, however, 
political bias is indicated in so far as the German CA participates in the Gesprächskreis Grüne 
Gentechnik ('talks circle on Green Genetic Engineering') which may be described as a broad-based 
lobby group including mainly actors with a vested interest in commercial crop and food 






biotechnology (see below). The Federal Environmental Agency (UBA), which devotes more 
attention to ecological issues and has less influence than the RKI in the approval procedure, does 
not form part of the initiative; nor are environmental, consumer and other NGOs members. 
 
The institutional tensions between the RKI and UBA as regards environmental precaution, which 
could open up opportunities for influence of environmental pressure groups, are not aired publicly 
but occur internally, behind closed doors. Although the UBA is less reluctant than the RKI to 
become involved in public debate, it avoids open criticism of RKI's position or that of other 
administrative bodies involved in the approval procedures. 
Generally, inter-ministerial communication and co-operation appears to work well. The question 
of whether and how to organize a combined evaluation of herbicide-tolerant crops and 
complementary herbicides, for example, has been settled by an inter-ministerial agreement among 
the RKI, UBA, BgVV, the Federal Biological Research Centre for Agriculture and Forestry 
(BBA), and the Federal Office for Plant Varieties (BSA). It seems reasonable to assume that 
internal understanding among the administrative bodies involved in the approval procedures closes 
rather than opens possibilities for public influence. Inter-ministerial communication and co-
operation closes regulatory gaps which otherwise could give NGOs the opportunity to intervene. 
The debate is internal, not open to public scrutiny. 
 
While it is difficult to judge whether opposition and protest really has no influence at all on the 
RKI's market approval statements and decisions, there is no obvious accomodation of public 
suspicion and protest. The CA interprets the Deliberate Release Directive as requiring assessment 
only of narrowly-defined 'adverse effects'. It regards present agricultural practices as a normative 
baseline for evaluating environmental effects of gm crops. In the RKI's view, the products which 
have already decided on, have no plausible effects which would worsen the present situation. As a 
result the CA, for example, judged that it would be acceptable if glufosinate became ineffective 
for controlling weeds in oilseed rape. The CA regards the development of resistance as a classic 
agronomic-economic problem, not as statutorily defined environmental harm. By contrast, NGOs 
request evidence that a gm crop would provide an environmental improvement over the present 
situation and would not preclude any potential options for sustainable agriculture.  
 
The RKI's 'precautionary approach' thus basically differs from that of its critics in that it bases its 
decisions on a rather narrow interpretation of the relevant Directive, which excludes the broader 
environmental concerns underlying the concepts of sustainable agriculture and biodiversity. At the 
same time, it advocates specific precaution-related measures. These measures are not based on the 
Deliberate Release Directive but take the form of general, and basically optional, advice. 
They include, first, the establishment of a gene register. (On the initiative of RKI, the possibility to 
establish such a register was included in EC Decision 97/35, amending Directive 90/220 and 
requiring labelling of all gm seeds as genetically modified.) The register is planned as a collection 






of information on transgenes released into the general 'gene pool'. The main idea behind it is that 
unintended and unpredictable interactions between different genetic modifications could cause the 
loss of the special use of a gm product or even reproduce hazards which the original genetic 
modification was to remove (for example, by re-activation of the production of an unwanted sub-
stance such as an allergen). The information provided by the gene register is meant to provide the 
basis for a technology use which takes these possible interactions into account (interview, RKI 
16.10.98).  
The same idea of risk precaution and preservation of product use is behind the RKI's second 
measure, advising applicants to restrict gene inserts to 'genes of interest' (interview, RKI 
15.04.98). Limiting inserted genes to those which are essential to the intended transformation 
reduces the probability of interactions, which will increase with the number of genes introduced 
into the general gene pool.  
A third measure is market stage monitoring. In the RKI's view, the knowledge gained from this 
measure could serve as a basis for future risk assessments and more complex approval decisions. 
For this reason, the RKI advocates market stage monitoring for herbicide-tolerant oilseed rape. 
The crop's hybridization capacity provides a special opportunity to detect readily measurable 
effects of a single-gene trait and thus facilitated 'learning for the future' (Buhk, 1997: 12). While 
NGOs cite inadvertent hyridization as a risk, the German CA welcomes such an effect as 
beneficial for advancing scientific knowledge.  
 
It is possible that these three precaution-related measures are linked to domestic pressures. 
However, they do not relate to the primary demands of critics and opponents. Labelling, for 
example, is not a special concern of the RKI. It considers comprehensive labelling to be an EU 
measure that is not scientifically grounded but 'merely' responds to political constraints. Perhaps 
the measures are more closely linked to precaution-related debates at EU level than to domestic 
debates. It seems reasonable to assume that the Article 21 committee, which provides the forum 
of national representation in the EU approval procedure, is used by national CAs as an 





Environmental NGOs, opposed to gm crops and food, face a lack of access to political and 
administrative decision-making and a technology-friendly voting behavior of the approval 
authority. They react to this situation with a strategic choice: the decision to concentrate on a 
market- and consumer-oriented policy that resorts to expressive and antagonistic forms of protest. 
 
Environmental organizations and local groups continue in their attempts to delay or obstruct field 
trials by formal objections and protest actions. The recent increase in the number of field trials, 






however, has importantly lowered the effectiveness of this protest strategy. This development 
together with the US exports of gm soya and widespread public opposition to gm food have 
induced environmental NGOs such as the German Federation for Environment and Nature 
Conservation (BUND) to focus on the food market in their struggle against the use of agricultural 
and food biotechnology. Greenpeace entered the biotechnology debate only since gm crops used 
for food production have reached the market stage. With Greenpeace the opponent side has 
gained support by an influential, very professionally working environmental organization which 
has run an extensive campaign against the commercialisation of gm soya.  
 
The environmental organizations Greenpeace and BUND are probably the NGOs most actively 
involved in this market-focused phase of the biotechnology conflict. Expectedly, consumer 
organizations do play a role. They are, however, much less broadly and intensively involved than 
environmental organizations. This may be explained by the following traditional characteristics of 
German consumer NGOs. Typically, they are politically moderate, semi-public organizations 
(most of them receive public funds), which aim at increasing the individual consumer's utility 
rather than protecting and advancing public goods such as environmental integrity. Further, they 
usually engage more actively in consumer risk debates in which there is evidence rather than 
uncertainty about negative effects.  
Not suprisingly, the most actively involved consumer organization is the Verbraucher Initiative 
(VI) which is financially independent and generally engaged in broader risk/uncertainty politics. 
Its main objective in the conflict at issue is consumer information and free consumer choice. Food 
safety is not a major concern; the key concern is transparency. 
 
While consumer organizations act only low level on the issue of gm food safety, this issue forms 
an integral part of the uncertainty/risk politics of environmental NGOs. A BUND publication on 
gm food, for example, states that "food is becoming Russian roulette with the fork especially for 
allergic persons" (BUND, 1996: 1; translation by the authors). From the outset of the 
biotechnology controversy, the protest of environmental NGOs was not exclusively based on 
environmental issues. It is part of their general strategy to deal with environmentally relevant 
issues in amalgamation with further concerns associated with the environment: such as concerns 
for human and animal health, ethics, or global inequalities. Accordingly, in the debate on gm crops 
and food environmental and health concerns are tied into an argumentative package. 
 
The objective of environmental NGOs is more far-reaching than that of the Verbraucher 
Initiative. The policy of BUND and Greenpeace is designed to keep gm food as widely as 
possible from the German market and, finally, prevent cultivation of gm crops. A key activity for 
this objective is the struggle for a comprehensive labelling policy. Comprehensive labelling is the 
basic prerequisite for informed consumer choice and the establishment of a market for non-gm 
foods. Because informed consumer choice is the major concern of consumer organizations, 






environmental and consumer NGOs have lobbied for strict labelling at federal and EU-level in a 
joint effort. 
At Länder level, (in Bavaria and Lower Saxony), church and environmental NGOs initiated a 
referendum (Volksbegehren) on the provision of a statutory basis for 'negative' (non-gm) labelling. 
In view of the seemingly dilatory policy at EU level concerning the implementation of regulations 
on mandatory 'positive' labelling, and the labelling gaps left by the EU Novel Food Regulation, the 
NGOs wanted additional regulatory initiatives at national/Länder level for a voluntary labelling 
scheme for foods produced without genetic engineering. The pressure that the Länder initiatives 
have brought to bear on the federal government has since resulted in a federal regulation 
concerning the voluntary labelling of such foods. It defines strict labelling criteria, based on the 
gm process rather than on detectability criteria, and is welcomed by the initiators of the 
referendum (FoEE, 1998b, p.5). Consumer organizations did not openly support this initiative. 
The Verbraucher Initiative, for example, sees a main problem in deciding whether products were 
'contaminated' deliberately or accidentally with gm ressources. 
 
In the efforts of BUND and Greenpeace at keeping gm food from the market, activities directed 
at public opinion formation play a major role. These activities initially are aimed at convincing 
consumers not to buy gm food. The policy of public mobilization and opinion formation builds 
mainly on expressive, publicity-oriented, confrontational forms of protest. Examples of such 
symbolic events are the BUND Germany tour with a giant inflatable "monster tomato" (BUND, 
1996), the occupation of the Unilever building in Hamburg by Greenpeace activists and the 
organization's more recent 'field actions' concerning the growing of Bt maize by the Swiss 
company Novartis in Germany. One of the two fields which Greenpeace activists detected was 
marked with a huge banner (of 400 square metres) carrying an 'X' as a symbol of genetic 
engineering and the label 'Beware, genetically manipulated'. The maize plants in the other field 
were mown down and tipped in front of an incinerator belonging to Novartis in Basel 
(Riewenherm, 1998: 129).   
 
The second pillar of the policy of public mobilization is information provision. A key activity is 
here the so-called 'Greenpeace-Einkaufsnetz' (Greenpeace-shopping net), a 'join in campaign' 
which the environmental organization started in March 1996. In the context of this information 
campaign, Greenpeace provides interested groups and individuals with a list of retailers and pro-
ducers who - according to their own information - do not use gm soyabean or who advocate the 
labelling of products produced from gm soyabean. The campaign was meant to allow 'informed 
purchase' before the EU-labelling regulations entered into force. Moreover, Greenpeace regularly 
orders analyses of different food products in order to obtain information about the diffusion of gm 
soyabean in food production. The Internet serves as one medium to publicise this kind of informa-
tion. 
 






Besides public mobilization, Greenpeace and BUND pursue a policy of persuasion as regards 
intermediaries and retailers. It seeks to convince these economic actors of the ecological 
advantages and economic opportunities of selling non-gm food. Part of this policy is to trace and 
provide information about suppliers of non-gm raw material worldwide.  
 
The commercialisation climate thus is characterized by NGO watchdog activities, carrying the risk 
of stigmatization of any gm product appearing in the shops and also the respective company, and 
a low consumer acceptance of these products repeatedly displayed in public opinion surveys. 
These circumstances have brought significant pressure to bear on actors with a vested interest in 
commercialization. The agro-food industry and the retail sector have responded to the hostile 
marketing situation in economic as well as political terms. Economically, the deterrent effects of 
public non-acceptance, NGO watchdog activities and strict labelling regulations have provoked a 
'policy of avoidance' as regards gm raw material and products. Politically, the response to the 
critical situation includes an intensification of public relations, a special effort to comply with the 
relevant regulations, and the attempt to join forces in a broad-based lobby group.  
 
Blockage of marketing 
 
Apparently, the retail sector and the food industry consider it highly likely that the negative public 
attitudes revealed by surveys, and NGO mobilization, will translate into a far-reaching refusal by 
consumers to buy gm products and/or more generally the products of those retailers and enter-
prises selling such products.  
 
Neither before the EC labelling Regulation 1139/98 for gm soya and maize came into force in 
September 1998, nor shortly after this date, could products labelled as gm be found on 
supermarket shelves. Spot-checks for gm soya ordered by Greenpeace, as well as spot-checks 
carried out by the responsible Länder control agencies, have shown that products containing 
modified soya are so far only of peripheral importance on the German market. The reason is that 
large parts of the retail sector, the economic sector closest to the individual consumer and thus 
more directly confronted with consumer demands, seeks supplies of non-gm products.  
 
The pressure that the retail sector brings to bear on its suppliers in turn has induced the food 
industry, itself open to the risk of stigmatization and boycott, to avoid the use of gm material as 
far as possible. To avoid GM soya, it has resorted to using conventional soya still in store, supply 
contracts for non-gm raw material, and modified recipes (for example, substituting soyabean oil 
by rape or sunflower oil). In food industry circles, it seems to be generally felt that the first to 
market gm products will have to pay the price of a loss in sales and negative public attention. The 
general view is: 'nobody wants to be the first'. Nestlé Germany did announce that it would take 
the risk of the 'first-mover-disadvantage' and market its first product labelled gm in September 






1998 (a chocolate bar called 'Butterfinger' made with genetically modified maize). However, so 
far it seems to be only service stations which sell the product. 
 
In sum, the anticipated consumer refusal and the defensive attitude of food retailers, who act, so 
to speak, as the 'final gate' to the consumer market, has brought about a 'quasi blockage' of the 
marketing of gm food in Germany (see Behrens et al., 1997: 101). 
 
Policy of accomodation and joining forces 
 
One way in which the technology providers, the agro-chemical industry, have reacted to this 
blockage is by an increase in the effort directed at public relations.  
A more indirect way in which they have sought to improve the commercial climate is by strict 
compliance with regulatory demands and administrative advice. This 'policy of accomodation' 
contrasts with the deregulatory pressures of the mid-1990s (Gill, 1996). Such pressures still exist, 
but they have lost in importance. Interviews with representatives of industry and administration 
suggest that the agro-chemical industry now acknowledges a greater dependence on regulatory 
procedures as a means to gain public acceptance. Apparently, it puts considerable effort into 
comprehensive compliance with regulatory demands as well as into accomodation of 
administrative advice which goes beyond obligatory requirements. AgrEvo, for example, on 
request of the Directorate General (DG) 24 (Consumer Issues) of the European Commission 
complemented its application documents for gm oilseed rape with a proposal for a monitoring 
programme. As an AgrEvo representative puts it: 'As an applicant one clutches at every straw' 
(interview, AgrEvo 20.04.98). 
 
Further, the problems of venturing into commercialization has induced the technology providers 
to join forces with the other economic sectors involved to institutionalize the sharing of 
information and co-ordination of lobbying activity. On the initiative of Novartis, the 
Gesprächskreis Grüne Gentechnik (GGG) was founded in February 1997. The 'talks circle', which 
sees itself as a confidential expert group (interview, GGG 08.04.98), may be described as a broad-
based lobby group with the support of the German CA.  
The RKI is one participant of the co-operative endeavour which includes major associations of the 
crop/feed/food marketing chain, one of the biggest food enterprises, and the major technology 
providers. While Monsanto initially did not participate, the company now takes an active part in 
the group (interview, GGG 08.04.98). Presumably, its participation has been used as an 
opportunity to bring the company 'into line' with the more sensitive European/German approach 
to commercialization. 
The overall aims of the group are to discuss issues of introducing, processing and selling 
genetically modified crops, to exchange information, experience and opinions (especially about 






commercial practices and supply sources) and to come to joint lobbying positions on the basis of 
this exchange. 
 
Extensive public relations, the policy of regulatory accomodation, and the co-operative endeavour 
in lobbying indicate: The new NGO strategies have brought great pressure to bear on the 
technology providers. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
According to the theory of reflexive modernization (Beck 1986), modern societies are confronted 
with a new kind of hazards which are not conceivable with the human sense, not clearly definable 
and not insurable. As a response, regulations have been established in the field of modern 
biotechnology since the 1970s which for the first time in history tries to operate with an open 
search horizon. The aim is to foresee and avoid negative effects which have still to be defined 
within the process of regulation itself (Gill 1998, 1999). This regulation was also implemented in 
Germany but into a traditional administrative setting with a science-based legalistic approach. This 
approach does not take into consideration that perceptions of 'risk' and 'safety' depend on 
participation and trust and that the absence of risks can never be positively proven (Gill 1996). 
 
As a consequence, Germany appears as the EU member state with the most difficult marketing 
situation (besides Austria) and the least administrative effort to respond to the reasons for this 
situation - public suspicion and protest. The administration's claim to prioritize scientific evidence 
over politics constructs the administration and the public as two separated worlds without real 
mediation.  
This contrasts with the ever growing demands for participation from NGOs, local groups, and 
citizens, who want to have a say in political decisions about contested technology. However, 
participation in a broader sense is not dependent on formal opportunities. In this conflict, 
environmental organizations bring up issues of democracy, transparency and precaution by means 
of public mobilization, and this policy has some effect. Corresponding to the low consumer 
acceptance, it has led to an 'anticipated' consumer boycott and commercial blockage. This, in turn, 
has led the technology providers, the agrochemical industry, to revise their political strategies in 
the biotechnology conflict. They increasingly have come to identify obedience to administrative 
measures as a means to gain public trust and acceptance. 
 
Thus, in Germany reflexive modernization takes place without reflexive politics. The need for 
precaution is strongly accepted within society - in terms of a more far reaching cognitive 
anticipation of potential consequences. But none of the opposing parties admits - publicly - the 
necessarily involved uncertainties of far reaching anticipation. 






Additionally, economic and environmental discourses seldom meet. The resonance of the 
sustainability discourse, for example, is rather low. Therefore, economic and environmental 
interests are mostly seen as contradiction - little effort is made to search for synergies between the 
two aims. Correspondingly, the conflict manifests itself in form of contradictory certainties (of 'no 
risk' versus 'risk') and non-negotiable values ('growth' versus 'nature'). In this situation, the 
administration, bound to a certain degree by the German tradition of the 'Rechtsstaat', mainly 
resorts to 'science' and 'law' to portray its decisions as a-political and neutral. It avoids both to 
openly defend its political discretion and try to mediate between the conflicting positions.  
 
Even the Technology Assessment which the Social Research Unit Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 
(WZB) carried out from 1991 to 1994 as regards herbicide tolerant gm crops - the most ambitious 
attempt to establish particpatory procedures, so far - was mostly dedicated and restricted to the 
search for truth (van den Daele, 1996; Saretzki, 1996). This seems to be in contrast especially 
with countries like Denmark and the Netherlands. Here, the conflict is more strongly dominated 
by the rhetorics of contradictory uncertainties. These allow for more participation and 
compromise based on the insight that negative consequences of present decisions will and can 
only be accepted when they are discussed openly and under representation of those who have to 
bear the potential damages. This does not mean that reflexive politics are necessarily more critical 
of biotechnology. Instead, it means that the decisions are more responsive to the real fears and 
wishes of the people. 
 
Here, even the new coalition government will probably not change so much. The coalition 
contract comprises a vague idea of changing the administrative structure of the Competent 
Authority, and within the Health Ministry a Green head of department seeks to implement more 
political accountability for this main regulatory body. But against these efforts of the Greens 
stands the dominant mood of the Social Democrats. 'Traditionalists' and 'Neo-Liberalists' resort to 
conventional modernization in seeing genetic engineering without much differentiation as a 'key 
technology' to provide national wealth and jobs. They see 'green romance' as a typical German 
manifestation of a cultural lag to allegedly more modern societies. 
The present turmoils in biotechnology policy in France and the United Kingdom, however, seem 
to show that this critical stance is not a peculiarity of German speaking countries. Furthermore, 
consumer demand and agricultural development in Europe indicate that organic farming has a 
more realistic potential to create new jobs than modern biotechnology. The question is, which 
path modern societies actually are taking - the path of high technology and conventional 
modernization or the path of postindustrial culturalisation and reflexive modernization. 
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